Brain drain or brain gain? Technology diffusion and learning on-the-job by Sampson, Thomas
  
ISSN 2042-2695 
 
 
 
CEP Discussion Paper No 1168 
September 2012 
Brain Drain or Brain Gain? 
Technology Diffusion and Learning On-the-job 
Thomas Sampson 
 
 
    
Abstract 
This paper develops a theory of technology transfer when technology is embodied in human 
capital and learning requires on-the-job communication between managers and workers. 
Patterns of knowledge diffusion depend on where high knowledge managers work and how 
much time they allocate to training workers. Managers appropriate the surplus training 
creates and in the open economy managers face a cross-country trade-off between labor costs 
and the value of knowledge transfer. Complementarity between country-wide efficiency and 
managerial knowledge makes learning more valuable in the North meaning that high 
knowledge managers choose to work in the North and globalization precipitates a brain drain 
of high knowledge Southern agents to the North. The brain drain reduces learning 
opportunities in the South and exacerbates cross-country knowledge differences. 
 
Keywords: Technology diffusion; managerial knowledge; learning on-the-job; FDI; brain 
drain 
JEL Classifications:  F2, J24, O33 
 
 
This paper was produced as part of the Centre’s Globalisation Programme. The Centre for 
Economic Performance is financed by the Economic and Social Research Council. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
Thomas Sampson is an Associate of the Globalisation Programme at the Centre for Economic 
Performance and a Lecturer in Economics, London School of Economics. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Published by 
Centre for Economic Performance 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
Houghton Street 
London WC2A 2AE 
 
All rights reserved.  No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval 
system or transmitted in any form or by any means without the prior permission in writing of 
the publisher nor be issued to the public or circulated in any form other than that in which it 
is published. 
 
Requests for permission to reproduce any article or part of the Working Paper should be sent 
to the editor at the above address. 
 
 T. Sampson, submitted 2012 
1 Introduction
Persistent total factor productivity (TFP) differences account for more than half of cross-country income
variation (Caselli 2005). This observation has stimulated a large literature seeking to understand interna-
tional variation in technology adoption. In recent years much work has focussed on the role played by
managerial know-how in determining productivity. Across both firms and countries there is substantial
heterogeneity in management practices and better quality management is strongly correlated with higher
productivity (Bloom and Van Reenen 2010). Burstein and Monge-Naranjo (2009) estimate average wel-
fare gains to developing countries from importing foreign managers of 3.5%. Further welfare gains may
be realized if domestic agents learn from imported managers (Monge-Naranjo 2011; Dasgupta 2012). The
potential benefits from knowledge transfers are demonstrated by Bloom et al. (2011) who use a field exper-
iment with large Indian textile firms to show that management training dramatically improves both a firm’s
management and its profitability. However, the factors that determine the equilibrium allocation of managers
across countries and cross-border transfers of managerial knowledge are still not fully understood.
This paper studies the effect of allowing free movement of managers across countries on international
differences in learning and the distribution of knowledge. I develop a model in which firms produce both
output and on-the-job knowledge transfers between managers and workers. Since managers internalize the
benefits of knowledge transfers, I show that firm location is determined by a trade-off between the cost of
labor and the value of knowledge. When the North is more productive than the South, labor is cheaper in the
South, but knowledge is more valuable in the North. Consequently, the high skilled managers from whom
workers learn the most set up firms in the North, while less able managers produce in the South. This sorting
of managers across countries precipitates a brain drain of the best Southern managers to the North, reduces
learning in the South and increases the knowledge gap between North and South.1
When knowledge is embodied in human capital and learning requires on-the-job communication be-
tween agents,2 then knowledge is excludable and knowledge diffusion depends on the welfare maximizing
choices made by a limited supply of high knowledge agents.3 The paper demonstrates that even in the ab-
1See Gibson and McKenzie (2011) for an overview of empirical findings related to brain drain.
2Arrow (1969) stresses the importance of inter-personal communication in facilitating technology diffusion.
3In contrast, much of the technology adoption literature treats technologies as disembodied ideas that are firm or country
specific and studies either the barriers faced by firms seeking to invest in new technologies (Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes
2005; Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes 2005; Parente and Prescott 1999; Comin and Hobijn 2009), or optimal technology transfers by
firms with monopoly ownership of ideas (Helpman 1984; Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple 2004). In both cases, the supply of high
knowledge agents does not constrain technology diffusion.
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sence of barriers to knowledge diffusion caused by market imperfections, low adoption capacity or legal
constraints, and even if lower labor costs appear to make the South an attractive destination, complemen-
tarity between the value of knowledge and country-specific efficiency can lead to a brain drain from South
to North. Moreover, differences in managerial knowledge across firms and countries are persistent despite
the existence of perfectly competitive, globally integrated markets and the absence of learning externalities.
The paper captures these ideas in a model of on-the-job learning, but it is likely to be a robust feature of
any embodied technology model in which cross-country heterogeneities imply that Northern agents value
advanced technologies more than Southern agents.
The model analyzed below is a dynamic general equilibrium model that endogenizes both managerial
location and the level of within firm knowledge transfers. I start from a span-of-control model of the firm
based on Lucas (1978) and Rosen (1982) in which production requires both labor and a managerial in-
put. There is heterogeneity across agents in entrepreneurial knowledge and high knowledge agents select
into management. I allow for on-the-job knowledge transfer between managers and workers. However,
learning-by-doing is not automatic. Learning and output are jointly produced within the firm, but the rela-
tive quantities produced depend on how the manager allocates her time between production and training.4
Anticipating higher future income, workers who receive training accept lower wages and equilibrium em-
ployment contracts are such that from the manager’s perspective she receives a price per unit of training
provided. Consequently, managers fully internalize the value of knowledge transfer and allocate time such
that the marginal cost of training in terms of foregone production, equals the marginal benefit in terms of
lower labor costs. Higher knowledge managers allocate more time to training because, although the vol-
umes of both output and learning produced per unit of managerial time are proportional to the manager’s
knowledge, the price of training is increasing in managerial knowledge.
To study cross-country knowledge transfers I consider a world with two countries: North and South.
Agents in both countries draw from the same initial knowledge distribution, but the North has higher effi-
ciency, which raises the productivity of all Northern agents in the production of both output and training.
This efficiency difference can be interpreted as the North having superior institutions, infrastructure or ed-
ucation. In the open economy there is free trade and managers can hire workers from either country, but
workers are immobile across countries. When international production teams are formed labor productiv-
4The joint production of learning and output is also found in Acemoglu (1997) and Acemoglu and Pischke (1998) in which
training and output production are separated temporally, but remain linked because of labor market imperfections that tie workers
to firms.
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ity depends on efficiency in the workers’ country and managerial productivity depends on efficiency in the
manager’s country. Since managers cannot hire workers from both countries simultaneously, the locations
of learning and output production must coincide and knowledge flows depend on where managers choose to
hire workers.
Managers’ choice of location depends on a trade-off between lower labor costs in the South and cross-
country differences in the price of training. The price of training is proportional to the increase in income
obtained by workers who are successfully trained and become managers. The relative price of training across
countries depends on the interaction between: (i) a profit effect – holding managerial knowledge constant
Northern managers make higher profits because the North has higher efficiency, and; (ii) a wage effect –
Northern workers receive a higher wage in the absence of training. Importantly, there is a complementarity
between country efficiency and managerial knowledge in the profit effect. At low knowledge levels the wage
effect dominates and the price of training is higher in the South, but for high knowledge managers the profit
effect dominates and the price of training is higher in the North. In equilibrium there is a threshold such that
all managers whose knowledge exceeds the threshold hire workers from the North.
Consequently, globalization precipitates a brain drain from the South as the best Southern managers
hire workers and offer training in the North. In the open economy equilibrium knowledge transfer is con-
centrated in the North and, instead of leading to convergence between knowledge levels in the South and
North, international knowledge flows act to magnify the knowledge gap. Extending the baseline model by
lowering the elasticity of managerial productivity with respect to country efficiency weakens the profit ef-
fect complementarity between country efficiency and managerial knowledge. This can reverse the sorting
of managers across countries, but only if the elasticity is sufficiently low and the relative efficiency of the
South is sufficiently high.
This paper is related to the work of Monge-Naranjo (2011) and Dasgupta (2012) who study the forma-
tion of international production teams when workers can learn from managers. In Monge-Naranjo (2011)
workers learn both from their manager and from economy wide knowledge spillovers. There are no effi-
ciency differences across countries, but, prior to globalization, Northern managers have higher knowledge
than Southern managers. A key finding is that the knowledge of Southern managers always converges to
Northern levels when there are no knowledge spillovers. In this paper I show that, because of comple-
mentarity between managerial knowledge and country efficiency, efficiency differences imply that the most
knowledgeable managers always train Northern workers. Therefore, convergence may not occur even in the
3
absence of learning externalities.
Dasgupta (2012) incorporates learning into a dynamic version of the Antra`s, Garicano and Rossi-
Hansberg (2006) model of offshoring and calibrates large potential welfare gains to low income countries
from inflows of foreign entrepreneurial knowledge. However, Dasgupta (2012) also abstracts from cross-
country efficiency differences. Consequently, globalization leads to a factor price equalization equilibrium
in which all managers are indifferent between operating in North and South, some of the best Northern
managers match with Southern workers and there is no brain drain from the South. Without heterogeneity
in efficiency I obtain similar predictions to Dasgupta (2012).
Closer in intent to this paper is the work of Beaudry and Francois (2010) who construct a model of
learning on-the-job in which agents from a country with a high discount rate or mortality rate value learning
less. This reduces the training surplus making the country less attractive to foreign managers and can lead
to an equilibrium with no knowledge transfer. However, unlike in this paper, all managers are homogenous
and the possibility of an equilibrium without knowledge transfer follows from the existence of a traditional
sector in which learning cannot occur, not from endogenous training decisions.
The paper also contributes to the debate over whether foreign direct investment (FDI) raises host country
productivity through knowledge transfers to workers in multinational enterprises (MNEs). The potential of
within firm knowledge transfers, in combination with labor turnover, to act as a channel through which
foreign knowledge diffuses into the domestic economy is widely recognized.5 Existing empirical work
is consistent with the idea that workers learn from foreign managers, but suggests that spillovers to other
firms and workers are small in developing countries. Balsvik (2011) finds that in Norway workers with
experience working for a MNE contribute 20% more to plant productivity than comparable workers without
MNE experience. Poole (2012) finds that Brazilian firms which employ a higher share of workers with
previous experience at MNEs pay higher wages, even after controlling for worker, firm and time fixed
effects. However, the effect is small. A 10% increase in the share of workers with MNE experience increases
wages by 0.6%. In a more limited sample Go¨rg and Strobl (2005) find that Ghanian manufacturing firms
have higher productivity when their owner previously worked for a MNE in the same industry, but only
when the owner has below median education. In addition, they find no evidence that the owner having
5See Glass and Saggi (2002) and Fosfuri, Motta and Ronde (2001) for models that study the FDI decision in oligopolistic markets
when the foreign firm knows that domestic workers will learn its technology and may defect to its competitors. For discussion of
the role played by spin-offs from hi-tech firms in knowledge diffusion in a closed economy see Chatterjee and Rossi-Hansberg
(2012), Franco and Filson (2006) and Cabral and Wang (2008).
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worked for a MNE in a different industry, or having received formal training from a foreign firm, affect
productivity.6 This paper suggests an explanation for the lack of substantial spillovers from FDI via the
labor turnover channel in developing countries. Even if workers can learn from higher knowledge foreign
managers, in equilibrium the highest skilled managers, who provide the most training, choose to set up firms
in developed countries where their training has the greatest value and the managers that hire workers from
developing countries provide little or no training.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 I lay out the model in a closed economy
setting and then solve for the closed economy equilibrium. Section 3 extends the model to a two country
world, characterizes the open economy equilibrium and discusses the welfare implications of global integra-
tion. Then in Section 4 I analyze how two extensions to the baseline model effect the sorting of managers
across countries. First, I vary the strength of the complementarity between country efficiency and manage-
rial knowledge and then I modify the training technology to include cross-worker heterogeneity in learning
ability. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 Closed economy
2.1 Model set-up
Consider an economy populated by a massR of heterogeneous agents. Time is discrete and each agent faces
a constant probability ζ of death per period. In addition, ζR agents are born each period ensuring that the
population remains constant over time. Each agent is endowed at birth with a skill level θ that represents
her managerial knowledge. I will use skill and managerial knowledge interchangeably when referring to θ.
At birth θ is drawn from a distribution with cumulative distribution function F . I assume F is continuously
differentiable and has continuous support on
[
θ, θ¯
]
, but I do not place any functional form restrictions on the
shape of F . Each agent’s skill evolves during her lifetime as she receives on-the-job training. The training
technology is described in detail below.
Agents are risk neutral and seek to maximize:
6See also Malchow-Møller, Markusen and Schjerning (2007) and Markusen and Trofimenko (2009) for evidence from Denmark
and Colombia, respectively. For case studies where labor turnover from a foreign entrant kick-starts the development of a domestic
industry see Hausmann and Rodrik (2003).
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Vt(θ) =
∞∑
s=t
(1− ζ)s−tδs−tCs, (1)
where δ ∈ (0, 1] is the discount factor and Cs denotes consumption of the single output good, which I take
as the numeraire. There is no storage technology so agents consume their entire income each period. Let
1− p ≡ (1− ζ)δ be agents’ effective discount factor.
Output is produced using a span-of-control technology based on Lucas (1978). Production uses labor
and a managerial input. Each agent can choose either to start a firm and become an owner-manager or
to be a worker. Although there is heterogeneity across agents in managerial knowledge, all agents who
select into wage labor supply Z efficiency units of labor per period. Z is an economy wide efficiency term
that determines not only labor productivity, but also the productivity with which the managerial input and
training are produced. Z should be interpreted as capturing the effect of institutions, infrastructure and the
education system on the efficiency with which all productive activities in an economy are performed. More
developed economies have higher Z and cross-country differences in Z will play a central role in the open
economy model in Section 3.
The managerial input is produced using managerial knowledge and a manager’s time. Each manager is
endowed with one unit of time per period, which she can split between production and training. A manager
with skill θ, who devotes a fraction x of her time to production in an economy with efficiency Z, supplies
xZθ units of managerial input.7 A firm that uses X units of managerial input and hires L workers produces
output:
Y =
(
X
α
)α( ZL
1− α
)1−α
, α ∈ (0, 1),
= Z
(
xθ
α
)α( L
1− α
)1−α
. (2)
The production process requires agents with different skills to interact within a firm. These interactions
can lead, through demonstration, instruction or observation, to intra-firm knowledge transfers. To introduce
learning into the model I assume that a worker can acquire new skills if she receives on-the-job training
from her manager. Successful training requires a worker to both receive instruction from her manager and to
7Rosen (1982) justifies a similar specification on the grounds that production requires a manager to spend time supervising her
workers.
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observe her manager in the act of production. In particular, I assume that a manager who devotes a fraction
h of her time to training produces H = hxτZ units of training, where τ > 0 is a parameter that measures
the efficiency of training. This training technology is a hybrid of an education technology that requires the
investment of costly resources and a learning-by-doing technology in which workers automatically learn
new skills through participating in the production process. Training is costly because it uses a manager’s
time and time used in training cannot be used in production. However, unlike models in which training
can be provided by a specialized education sector, training also requires production experience as an input
meaning it must occur on-the-job. Substituting the time constraint x + h = 1 into the expression for H
gives:
H = h(1− h)τZ. (3)
Using the terminology of Becker (1964) all training is general, not specific, and a worker with skill θ(t)
in period t who receives q ≤ 1 units of training from a manager with skill θ′ > θ(t) has probability q of
learning her manager’s skill level. Therefore, the worker’s skill θ(t+ 1) in period t+ 1 is given by:
θ(t+ 1) =
 θ
′ with probability q,
θ(t) otherwise.
(4)
In general, it is not clear how the volume of training produced H should depend on managerial skill
θ. In this paper the training technology is such that holding time spent training h constant the volume of
training produced is independent of θ. However, allowing the volume of training produced to increase in
managerial skill, by assuming H = hxτZθ, does not qualitatively affect the model’s implications. The key
feature of the training technology is that more knowledgeable managers train workers to a higher skill level,
implying that the value of each unit of training is increasing in managerial skill.
Training does not require any input from workers, meaning that workers supply Z efficiency units of
labor to the firm regardless of whether or not they receive training. However, because training is on-the-job,
workers can only receive training from their own manager. This has two important implications: firstly,
managers can never receive training, and; secondly, the location of production and training are jointly deter-
mined. The joint location of production and training will play a central role in the open economy model.
There is perfect competition in both the output market and the labor market. Employment contracts
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can be written for one period only and each agent chooses in every period whether they want to select into
management or wage labor. Employment contracts are defined by the quadruple (θ′, w˜, q, θ) representing
the manager’s skill level θ′, the wage paid w˜, the amount of training received by the worker q and the
worker’s skill level θ. Workers take the set of employment contracts in non-zero supply as given and choose
the contract that maximizes (1) subject to the training technology (4). Firms take the labor supply function
as given and offer the set of employment contracts that maximizes profits subject to (2), (3) and (4).8 Agents
choose to be either workers or managers based on which occupation maximizes their expected lifetime
utility given by (1). In equilibrium the market for workers with each skill level clears. Note that there are no
learning externalities in the model, instead agents fully internalize the costs and benefits of training.
Finally, I will assume that the model’s parameters satisfy the following restrictions:
τ <
4ζ
1− ζ
1
Z
, (A1)
τ >
p
1− p
1
Z
. (A2)
I will discuss the role played by Assumptions (A1) and (A2) when solving for the steady state equilibrium
in the next sub-section, but note that since p ≥ ζ Assumption (A1) implies τ < 4p1−p 1Z .
2.2 Closed economy equilibrium
The first step in solving the model is to characterize the set of employment contracts that are written in
equilibrium. Achieving this characterization permits a considerable simplification of the firm’s profit max-
imization problem which, in turn, makes the remainder of the model tractable. Let Ψt(θ) denote the set of
employment contract triples (θ′, w˜, q) that firms offer to workers with skill θ and let W and M superscripts
denote workers and managers, respectively. Given the specification of the training technology, the value
function in (1) can be expressed as:
8For ease of exposition, I assume that whenever a firm is indifferent between two employment contracts it offers both contracts.
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Vt(θ) = max
{
V Wt (θ), V
M
t (θ)
}
, (5)
VMt (θ) = pit(θ) + (1− p)Vt+1(θ), (6)
V Wt (θ) = max
(θ′,w˜,q)∈Ψt(θ)
{
w˜ + (1− p) [qVt+1(θ′) + (1− q)Vt+1(θ)]} , (7)
where pit(θ) is the period t profit function of a firm owned by a manager with skill θ. To obtain (6) I have
used that a manager’s skill level remains constant over time, while for (7) I have used that a worker who
receives q units of training from a manager with skill θ′ has probability q of learning the manager’s skill
level and probability 1− q of learning nothing.
I will solve for the steady state equilibrium of the economy. In steady state all value functions, the profit
function, the set of employment contracts that are written and the mapping from skill levels to occupations
are time invariant. Making use of this time invariance, equation (6) can be solved giving:
VM (θ) =
pi(θ)
p
. (8)
Let ψ(θ) ⊆ Ψ(θ) be the set of employment contract triples that maximize the worker’s value function
V W (θ). To characterize the set of steady state employment contracts I will start by showing ψ(θ) is inde-
pendent of θ, meaning that employment contracts do not depend on workers’ managerial knowledge and all
workers are indifferent between all contracts that are written in equilibrium. This result follows from the
assumptions that: (i) all workers supply the same quantity Z of efficiency units of labor, and; (ii) the proba-
bility a worker is successfully trained is independent of her initial managerial knowledge.9 Together, these
assumptions imply that all agents who select into wage labor are symmetric as workers and, consequently,
are offered the same set of employment contracts. Thus, Ψ(θ) is independent of θ. Moreover, (7) implies
that the expected lifetime utility of a worker who accepts an employment contract is independent of her
initial managerial knowledge. Therefore, all workers will be willing to accept the same set of employment
contracts ensuring that ψ(θ) does not depend on θ. Lemma 1 summarizes this result. A formal proof is
given in the Appendix.
Lemma 1. In steady state, employment contracts do not depend on workers’ managerial knowledge.
9In Section 4.2 below I analyze an extension of the model that relaxes this assumption.
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An immediate corollary of Lemma 1 is that V W is independent of θ. Since all agents who select into
wage labor are equally productive and, in steady state, the mapping from skill levels to occupations is
stationary, the expected lifetime utility of a worker is independent of her managerial knowledge. Using this
result, together with (7) and (8) shows that for all contracts (θ′, w˜, q) which occur in equilibrium the wage
w˜ must satisfy:
w˜ = [1− (1− p)(1− q)]V W − (1− p)qpi(θ
′)
p
. (9)
Note that when no training is given the wage is independent of the manager’s skill level. Let w be the “no
training wage” that is paid to a worker who does not receive training. From (9), when q = 0 we have:
V W =
w
p
, (10)
and substituting this expression back into (9) implies that the wage w˜(q, θ′) paid by any contract that is
observed in equilibrium is given by:
w˜(q, θ′) = w − c(θ′)q, where c(θ′) = 1− p
p
[
pi(θ′)− w] . (11)
Trainees receive a lower wage today in expectation of higher income tomorrow. In particular, the wage
paid is linearly decreasing in the amount of training given, with a slope proportional to the difference be-
tween the profit flow the trainee will obtain if the training is successful and the no training wage. c(θ′) is the
price of training – the amount a worker will pay for one unit of training from a manager with skill θ′. If the
training price is greater than the no training wage then the wage paid w˜(q, θ′) can in principle be negative.
To allow for this possibility I assume that agents are not credit constrained. Since a worker who receives one
unit of training is certain to learn her manager’s skill, no worker will pay for more than one unit of training.
Subject to this constraint, both workers and managers are indifferent as to how the manager allocates the
training she produces across workers within her firm. Consequently, the distribution of training within the
firm is indeterminate, but this indeterminacy does not extend to any firm level or aggregate variables. The
simple characterization of equilibrium wage determination given in (11) plays a central role in making the
model tractable. Note that (11) holds regardless of the functional forms of the output production technology
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(2) or the training production technology (3).10
Equation (10) shows that a worker’s expected lifetime utility is independent of whether or not she re-
ceives training, meaning that managers capture the entire surplus training creates. Consequently, a man-
ager’s income depends on both output production and training production and to maximize profits the firm
must take account of the value of learning. The model implies that managers appropriate the training sur-
plus ex-ante through paying lower wages. However, an alternative set-up in which employment contracts
obliged a successful trainee to become a manager in the firm which trained her, thereby allowing the firm to
appropriate the training surplus ex-post, would have identical implications for managerial decision making.
Substituting (8) and (10) into (5) it is clear that agents select into management if and only if pi(θ) ≥ w.
The next step is to solve for pi(θ). Using (2), (3), (11) and X = xZθ the firm’s profit maximization problem
is:
max
h≥0,L≥0
Z
(
(1− h)θ
α
)α( L
1− α
)1−α
− wL+ h(1− h)τZc(θ). (12)
This is a concave problem with solution:11
L∗(θ) =
1− α
α
[1− h∗(θ)] θ
(w
Z
)− 1
α
, (13)
h∗(θ) =
 0 if
c(θ)
θ <
1
τ
(
w
Z
)α−1
α ,
1
2
[
1− θτc(θ)
(
w
Z
)α−1
α
]
otherwise.
(14)
A manager provides training to her workers if and only if the price of training relative to her skill level
(the training price per unit of skill) exceeds a threshold that is strictly decreasing in the ratio of the no training
wage to efficiency wZ . I will call this ratio the efficiency wage since it represents the wage per efficiency unit
of labor when workers receive no training. Whenever a manager provides training, the fraction of her time
allocated to training is strictly increasing in both the training price per unit of skill and the efficiency wage
and is bounded above by one half. A higher training price per unit of skill, or a higher efficiency wage,
increases the profitability of training relative to output production causing the manager to allocate more of
10Monge-Naranjo (2011) obtains an analogous result in a setting where skill acquisition results from investment decisions by
workers rather than managers’ allocation of time to training.
11Since no worker will pay for more than one unit of training a manager can sell at most L∗(θ) units of training. To avoid a
taxonomy of cases I will assume 2(1 − p)(1 − α) > α [τZ(1− p)− p], which, together with the definition of θ2 below, ensures
that H∗(θ) < L∗(θ) meaning the constraint is non-binding.
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her time to training. However, spending less time on output production reduces the contribution of learning-
by-doing to skill transfer and this creates diminishing returns to managerial time allocated to training. As a
result a manager never allocates more than half her time to training.12 Note also that, holding managerial
knowledge constant, employment is decreasing in time allocated to training. More time used for training
means less managerial input employed in production and, consequently, a smaller optimal workforce.
Substituting the expressions for labor demand (13) and training supply (14) into (12) the firm’s profit
function is:
pi(θ) =
 θZ
1
αw
α−1
α if c(θ)θ <
1
τ
(
w
Z
)α−1
α ,
1
4τZc(θ)
[
θZ
1
αw
α−1
α + τZc(θ)
]2
otherwise.
(15)
We can now use the definition of c(θ) in (11) together with (15) to solve for the training price per unit of
skill.
c(θ)
θ
=

1−p
p
[
Z
1
αw
α−1
α − wθ
]
if θ < θ2,
θZ
1
αw
α−1
α −2w+2Z 1αwα−1α
[
(wZ )
2
α−θ(wZ )
1
α+ p
1−p
θ2
τZ
] 1
2
4pθ
1−p−τZθ
otherwise,
where θ2 ≡
(
w
Z
) 1
α τZ(1−p)
τZ(1−p)−p . Assumption (A1) ensures that the solution for c(θ) is well-defined when
θ > θ2.
The training price per unit of skill, c(θ)θ , is increasing in θ,
13 and c(θ)θ <
1
τ
(
w
Z
)α−1
α ⇔ θ < θ2. That is,
θ2 is a threshold skill level such that only managers with skill above θ2 provide training. At low skill levels
allocating time to training workers is unprofitable, but as managerial skill increases the price of training
increases more quickly than managers’ productivity in production. Consequently, the relative value of time
allocated to training rises. Assumption (A2) ensures the efficiency of training is sufficiently high that there
is a finite, positive skill threshold at which managers start to provide training.14 When θ > θ2 time allocated
to training h∗(θ) is increasing in θ. Note that to obtain this prediction it is sufficient to assume more
skilled managers train workers to a higher skill level and the volume of training produced (3) is independent
of managerial skill. Modifying the training technology (3) to allow more skilled managers to produce a
12The fact that the upper bound equals one half is a consequence of the quadratic form of the training technology (3). However,
the implication that managers will not specialize in training holds whenever production experience is an essential input to training.
13To see this differentiate the expression for c(θ)
θ
above with respect to θ.
14If (A2) does not hold then c(θ)
θ
< 1
τ
(
w
Z
)α−1
α ∀ θ and there is no training.
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greater quantity of training for a given time allocation would only strengthen the incentive for higher skilled
managers to allocate more time to training. The prediction that h∗(θ) is increasing in θ is is consistent with
empirical work on the incidence of training at the firm level. For example, Almeida and Aterido (2010)
use firm level data from 99 countries to show that the probability a firm provides formal training to its
employees is higher when the firm’s manager has a tertiary education or when the firm is more productive
(where productivity is proxied by employment, R&D investment, exporting or foreign ownership).
Using (15) we also have that:
pi(θ) > w ⇔ θ > θ1 ≡
(w
Z
) 1
α
.
Note that θ1 is strictly increasing in the efficiency wage. It is now possible to fully characterize agents’
occupational selection for a given value of the no training wage.
Proposition 1. In steady state there exist threshold skill levels θ1 < θ2 such that: (i) agents with skill below
θ1 become workers; (ii) agents with skill in (θ1, θ2) become managers, but do not provide any training, and;
(iii) agents with skill above θ2 become managers and give training. Both thresholds are increasing in the
efficiency wage wZ .
Figure 1 illustrates occupation selection in the closed economy. It shows the no training wage, w, the profit
function for a firm that does not offer training and the profit function for a firm that provides the optimal
amount of training, pi(θ), all plotted as a function of managerial skill, θ.15
All that remains to complete the solution of the closed economy model is to find the no training wage.
To do this we must first solve for the steady state skill distribution, G(θ). From Proposition 1 it follows that
G(θ) must satisfy:
15The prediction that some managers do not provide training is a consequence of the quadratic form of the training technology
(3) which implies the marginal product of time allocated to training is bounded as h→ 0. If instead we assume H = hγ
γ
τZ
with 0 < γ < 1 then all managers with θ > θ1 give training. With this training technology we still have that time allocated to
training is strictly increasing in both the efficiency wage and c(θ)
θ
and, under appropriate parameter restrictions, that c(θ)
θ
is strictly
increasing in θ. However, with an isoelastic training technology the model is less tractable in general equilibrium. In particular, the
methodology used to prove the existence of a unique autarky equilibrium in Proposition 2 below cannot be applied.
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G(θ1) = (1− ζ)
[
G(θ1)−
∫ θ¯
θ2
H∗(θ)g(θ)dθ
]
+ ζF (θ1),
g(θ) =
 (1− ζ)g(θ) + ζf(θ) if θ1 < θ < θ2,(1− ζ)g(θ) + ζf(θ) + (1− ζ)H∗(θ)g(θ) if θ2 < θ.
To understand the expression for G(θ1) note that each period a mass R
∫ θ¯
θ2
H∗(θ)g(θ)dθ of workers is
successfully trained, a fraction ζ of workers dies and RζF (θ1) new workers are born. In addition, since in
steady state all workers are symmetric, we only need to keep track of the fraction of agents with skill below
θ1. Similar logic can be used to obtain the remaining two expressions. Solving these equations gives:
G(θ1) = F (θ1)− 1− ζ
ζ
∫ θ¯
θ2
ζH∗(θ)
ζ − (1− ζ)H∗(θ)f(θ)dθ, (16)
g(θ) =
 f(θ) if θ1 < θ < θ2,ζf(θ)
ζ−(1−ζ)H∗(θ) if θ2 < θ.
Remembering that h∗(θ) is bounded above by one half, Assumption (A1) is sufficient to ensure that the
solution for G(θ) is well-defined. Training implies that the steady state skill distribution G has first order
stochastic dominance over the skill distribution at birth F . Mass is shifted from the lower tail below θ1 to
the upper tail above θ2.
Obtaining labor demand from (13) the labor market clearing condition, which determines the no training
wage, is:
G(θ1) =
1− α
α
1
θ1
[∫ θ2
θ1
θg(θ)dθ +
∫ θ¯
θ2
[1− h∗(θ)] θg(θ)dθ
]
. (17)
Without assuming a functional form for F we cannot solve for the no training wage explicitly. However, it
can be shown that the labor market clearing condition defines a unique efficiency wage which is increasing
in Z.
Proposition 2. The steady state no training wagew is uniquely determined. In any steady state with training
the efficiency wage wZ is strictly increasing in Hicks-neutral efficiency Z. Otherwise,
w
Z is independent of Z.
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The proof of Proposition 2 is in the Appendix. For a given efficiency wage, higher Z makes management
more profitable which raises the value of training. Consequently, the training price per unit of skill increases
causing managers to allocate more time to training and successfully train more workers. The rise in training
causes labor demand per manager, given in (13), to fall, but, aggregate labor demand grows because of
the higher number of managers. To bring the labor market back into equilibrium the efficiency wage must
increase.
When θ2 ≥ θ¯ there is no training in the steady state equilibrium and the efficiency wage is independent
of Z. Since θ2 = θ1
τZ(1−p)
τZ(1−p)−p , whenever θ¯ is finite there will be no training provided Z is sufficiently small.
Thus, there is no learning in low efficiency economies. If θ2 > θ¯ then θ2 is strictly decreasing in Z, but in
general the effect of higher efficiency on θ2 is ambiguous. Higher Z has a direct negative effect on θ2, but
the induced efficiency wage increase pushes in the opposite direction. Figure 2 plots θ1 and θ2 against Z for
a case where the relationship between Z and θ2 is U-shaped.16 This completes the characterization of the
closed economy equilibrium.
3 Open economy
3.1 Open economy equilibrium
To understand how globalization affects knowledge transfers suppose now that there are two countries:
North and South. I am interested in how efficiency differences between North and South affect firm location
and the equilibrium skill distribution in each country. I will useN and S superscripts to denote Northern and
Southern variables, respectively. The two countries are identical in all respects except that the North has a
higher efficiency, ZN > ZS , and their populations may differ. There is free trade in the output good. Work-
ers are immobile across countries, but agents who select into management may choose to form a production
team with workers in either country – although not with workers from both countries simultaneously. To
simplify the presentation I will mostly focus on the case where the South is small relative to the North, but
I will also show that the main results continue to hold when both North and South are large economies.17
I assume that when a manager forms an international production team labor productivity is determined
16Figure 2 is drawn with α = 1
3
, τ = 0.9, ζ = 0.2, δ = 1 and F a truncated Pareto distribution on [0.2, 1] with shape parameter
k = 1. Figures 5 and 6 below also use these parameter values.
17Since ZN > ZS the open economy versions of (A1) and (A2) are τ < 4ζ
1−ζ
1
ZN
and τ > p
1−p
1
ZS
. I assume these restrictions
hold.
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by efficiency in the workers’ country and managerial productivity is determined by efficiency in the man-
ager’s country. Thus, if a manager from country j with skill θ forms a production team with L workers
from country k and devotes a fraction 1−h of her time to production then she provides (1−h)Zjθ units of
managerial input and the workers supply ZkL efficiency units of labor. There are two ways to motivate this
assumption. First, consider a world in which a manager who forms an international production team is based
in her home country and uses information and communications technology to interact with and monitor her
workers remotely. Then it is natural to assume that each factor’s productivity will depend on the efficiency
in the country where that factor is located. Alternatively, suppose a manager who hires foreign workers
relocates to the same country as her employees. In this case we can think of Zk as a measure of the quality
of education of agents from country k. Both labor productivity and managerial productivity are proportional
to education, but whereas individual managerial skill is transferable through training, agents are endowed
with a non-transferable country specific education level prior to entering the workforce. The mathematical
formulation of the model is consistent with either of these interpretations. For ease of exposition I will refer
to the country in which a manager hires workers as her firm’s host country or location.
The key difference from the closed economy model is that in addition to optimizing over employment
and her time allocation, a manager must decide whether to hire workers from the North or the South. The
firm’s profit maximization problem can be broken into two stages. First, maximize profits holding location
fixed. Second, choose the location with higher profits. Let pijk(θ) be the profits made by a firm with
manager from country j and workers from country k and let pij(θ) = max
{
pijN (θ), pijS(θ)
}
. As in the
closed economy equilibrium wage contracts are given by (11), but the no training wage and the price of
training are now host country dependent. Therefore, holding its location fixed, the firm faces the profit
maximization problem:
max
h≥0,L≥0
(
Zj
)α (
Zk
)1−α((1− h)θ
α
)α( L
1− α
)1−α
− wkL+ h(1− h)τZjck(θ), (12′)
with solution:
Ljk∗(θ) =
1− α
α
[
1− hk∗(θ)
]
θ
Zj
Zk
(
wk
Zk
)− 1
α
, (13′)
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hk∗(θ) =

0 if c
k(θ)
θ <
1
τ
(
wk
Zk
)α−1
α
,
1
2
[
1− θ
τck(θ)
(
wk
Zk
)α−1
α
]
otherwise.
(14′)
As in the closed economy firms only give training if the training price exceeds a threshold value, but now
both the training price and the threshold depend on where the firm locates. From (13′) we see that, holding
managerial skill and firm location fixed, managers from the high efficiency North will hire more workers
than managers from the South. In addition, (14′) shows that the fraction of her time a manager allocates to
training is independent of her country of origin. Using (13′) and (14′) we can write pijk(θ) = Zjθp˜ik(θ)
where:
p˜ik(θ) =
[
1− hk∗(θ)
](wk
Zk
)α−1
α
+ τhk∗(θ)
[
1− hk∗(θ)
] ck(θ)
θ
. (18)
It immediately follows that choice of firm location does not depend on which country a manager comes from.
All managers with skill θ will locate in the country where p˜ik(θ) is higher. This result greatly simplifies
analysis of the open economy equilibrium. It is a consequence of the fact that the equilibrium quantities of
output and training produced by a profit maximizing firm are both proportional to efficiency in the manager’s
home country.
A second implication of (18) is that firms which do not give training always locate in the country with
the lower efficiency wage. This is intuitive – absent training managers simply seek out the lowest cost labor
available. However, managers that do give training must take into account not only the cost of labor, but
also the price workers will pay for training. Let p˜i(θ) = max
{
p˜iN (θ), p˜iS(θ)
}
. Then, recalling (11), we can
write the price of training as:18
ck(θ) =
1− p
p
Zk
[
θp˜i(θ)− w
k
Zk
]
. (19)
Suppose w
N
ZN
< w
S
ZS
, then (19) and ZN > ZS together imply cN (θ) > cS(θ) whenever the price of training
is positive in either country. If the North has both a lower efficiency wage and a higher price of training
then all managers will hire workers from the North. In this case the Southern labor market will not clear.19
18Note that provided the volume of training produced H is proportional to Zj , (19) holds regardless of how H depends on the
time allocated to training.
19To rule out the possibility of an equilibrium in which all agents in the South become managers note that to obtain a non-zero
labor supply in the North we must have: θp˜i(θ) < w
N
ZN
⇒ θp˜i(θ) < wS
ZS
. This ensures a non-zero labor supply in the South also.
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Therefore, the efficiency wage cannot be lower in the North and we have the following result.
Proposition 3. In the open economy steady state the efficiency wage is weakly higher in the North than in
the South: w
N
ZN
≥ wS
ZS
. Whenever the efficiency wage is strictly higher in the North all managers who do not
give training hire workers from the South.
The (weakly) higher efficiency wage in the North is necessary to ensure that at some skill levels man-
agers face a trade-off between cheaper labor in the South and more valuable training in the North. This
trade-off, which exists because on-the-job learning necessitates the joint production of output and training,
is central to the open economy model. From (19) we see that the training price is proportional to the dif-
ference between the profits a worker will make if successfully trained and the no training wage. The no
training wage is higher in the North generating a wage effect which favors training in the South. However,
Northern managers make higher profits and this profit effect provides an incentive for training in the North.
The size of the wage effect is independent of managerial skill, but from differentiating (19) we have that:
∂2ck(θ)
∂Zk∂θ
=
1− p
p
∂
∂θ
[θp˜i(θ)]
> 0.
Thus, the training price in country k is supermodular in Zk and θ and this complementarity between man-
agerial skill and host country efficiency implies that the profit effect becomes stronger as θ increases. At low
skill levels the wage effect dominates and the training price is higher in the South, but at high skill levels the
profit effect dominates and the training price is higher in the North (see Figure 3).20
At skill levels such that the training price is higher in the South, managers who give training must prefer
to locate in the South because Southern workers are both cheaper and pay more for training. However, at skill
levels for which the price of training is higher in the North, managers face a trade-off between labor costs
and the value of training. Since relative labor costs across countries are independent of a manager’s skill
level, but the relative price of training in the North is increasing in θ the training price effect dominates the
labor cost effect only at sufficiently high skill levels. Figure 4 shows p˜iS(θ) and p˜iN (θ). Low skill managers
do not give training and locate in the South where the efficiency wage is lower. As managerial knowledge
20Figures 3 and 4 show the case where w
N
ZN
> w
S
ZS
. If w
N
ZN
= w
S
ZS
then c
N (θ)
cS(θ)
= Z
N
ZS
∀ θ and p˜iN (θ) = p˜iS(θ)∀ θ ≤ θN2 = θ∗.
18
increases so does the price of training and there exist threshold skill levels θk2 , k = S,N such that managers
who locate in country k give training whenever θ > θk2 . These thresholds vary across host countries, but are
independent of which country the manager is from. Among managers whose skill exceeds θN2 profitability
rises faster in the North than in the South and there exists some θ∗ such that θ > θ∗ ⇒ p˜iN (θ) > p˜iS(θ)
meaning managers locate in the North whenever their skill exceeds θ∗. A formal proof of this result, which
relies on showing that p˜iS(θ) and p˜iN (θ) satisfy a single crossing property, can be found in the Appendix as
part of the proof of Proposition 4. Figure 4 is drawn with θN2 < θ
2
S and θ
S
2 < θ
∗, but these restrictions will
not always hold.
As in the closed economy agents select into management when profits exceed the no training wage.
This generates thresholds θj1, j = S,N such that an agent in country j becomes a manager if and only if
her skill level θ > θj1. In the proof of Proposition 4 I show that θ
S
1 ≤ θN1 with strict inequality whenever
the efficiency wage is strictly higher in the North. Therefore, the skill threshold for becoming a manager is
higher in the North than in the South. Proposition 4, which holds regardless of the relative sizes of North
and South, summarizes equilibrium sorting into occupations and locations in the open economy. The proof
is in the Appendix.
Proposition 4. In the open economy steady state there exist threshold skill levels θS1 , θN1 , θS2 , θ∗ with θS1 ≤
θN1 , θ
S
1 < θ
S
2 and θ
N
1 < θ
∗ such that: (i) Southern agents with skill below θS1 and Northern agents with
skill below θN1 become workers while all other agents become managers; (ii) managers with skill below
min
{
θS2 , θ
∗} do not give any training; (iii) managers with skill in (θS2 , θ∗) hire workers from the South and
give training, and; (iv) managers with skill above θ∗ hire workers from the North and give training.
This is the main result of the paper. It tells us that in any steady state in which training occurs21 there
is a brain drain from the South as the highest skill managers set up firms in the North. Consequently: (i)
managers who set up firms in the South spend less time training workers than managers in the North; (ii)
Southern agents who are trained learn less than Northern trainees, and; (iii) in steady state, the North has
a higher proportion of the most highly skilled agents. In fact, if θ∗ ≤ θS2 , which is guaranteed when the
efficiency wage is equal across countries, there will be no training in the South. In addition to the brain
drain of high skill managers from South to North, Proposition 4 implies a flow of less skilled managers with
θ ∈ (θN1 , θ∗) from North to South. These managers allocate a lower proportion of their time to training than
21There will be no training in either country if θ¯ < min
{
θS2 , θ
∗}. However, if wS
ZS
< w
N
ZN
then θ∗ < θ¯ must hold to ensure
non-zero labor demand in the North.
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the more highly skilled managers who operate firms in the North and, consequently, their location decision is
driven by the desire to access low cost labor in the South. The existence of two way cross-border managerial
flows, with managers from different segments of the skill distribution moving in opposite directions, is a key
empirically testable prediction of the model. It implies the most skilled Indian agents will manage US firms,
while less skilled US managers will run Indian firms.
Labor market clearing conditions pin down the no training wages wS and wN , which in turn define
the skill thresholds. With the skill distribution F unrestricted, the labor market clearing conditions are
insufficiently tractable to permit a general characterization of the dependence of wS and wN on the model’s
parameters. Therefore, to make further progress I will now restrict attention to the case where South is a
small economy.
Under this assumption integration with the South leaves the no training wage in the North unchanged.
Also, to ensure labor market clearing in the South the efficiency wage must be the same in both countries.22
Consequently, in the open economy:
wS
ZS
=
wN
ZN
=
wN,A
ZN
,
where the A superscript is used to denote an autarky value. In both countries agents with skill in (θN,A1 , θ
N,A
2 )
become managers, do not give training and are indifferent between locating in the North and the South.
Agents with skill above θN,A2 become managers, give training and hire workers in the North. From Propo-
sition 2 we know that in a closed economy ddZ
(
w
Z
)
> 0 whenever some managers undertake training in
equilibrium. Therefore, provided θ∗ = θN,A2 < θ¯ integrating with the North raises the no training wage
in the South.23 Consequently, θS1 > θ
S,A
1 and globalization causes occupational downgrading in the South
with the least skilled Southern managers moving into wage labor.24 Moreover, it follows from w
S
ZS
= w
N
ZN
that in the open economy equilibrium wS is increasing in both ZS and ZN . Combining these observations
gives the following result.
22If w
S
ZS
< w
N
ZN
then all managers that do not give training will hire workers in the South. Since a positive fraction of Northern
managers have skill θ ∈ (θN1 , θ∗) and South is a small country it follows that labor demand will exceed labor supply in the South.
23If θN,A2 ≥ θ¯, then prior to globalization both the North and the South are in equilibria where there is no training and θ1 is
independent of Z. In this case there is no incentive for managers to form global production teams and global integration has no
effects.
24Since the relationship between Z and θ2 in the closed economy is non-monotonic, the ordering of θS,A2 and θ
∗ = θN,A2 is
uncertain. However, provided Z
S
ZN
is sufficiently small then θS2 > θ∗ and integration causes some high skill Southern managers
who did not give training in the closed economy to start training.
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Proposition 5. If South is a small economy then in the open economy steady state the efficiency wage is
constant across countries and no training takes place in the South. Provided a positive mass of managers
give training in the North, the open economy efficiency wage is higher than South’s autarky efficiency wage.
The changes in the no training wage and the skill thresholds in the South following integration with the
North are instantaneous, meaning that at the individual level adjustment to the new steady state is immediate.
However, whenever training occurred in the South prior to integration the skill distribution in the South
displays transition dynamics as agents that received training before integration die off. Since there is no
training in the South following globalization the Southern skill distribution GS(θ) converges over time to
F (θ). Consequently, the autarky steady state skill distribution first order stochastically dominates the open
economy steady state skill distribution. Globalization leads to deskilling in the South as knowledge transfer
concentrates in the North where the value of training is higher.
It is useful to compare the predictions of the open economy model with those obtained by Monge-
Naranjo (2011) and Dasgupta (2012). In both these papers countries have the same efficiency, but differ in
their initial knowledge distribution. Monge-Naranjo (2011) finds that the knowledge of Southern managers
may fail to converge to Northern levels only if there are externalities in the learning technology. By con-
trast, this paper shows that, if efficiency differences cause the highest skill managers to sort into the North,
convergence will not occur even when the value of knowledge transfers is fully internalized. In Dasgupta
(2012) globalization leads to a factor price equalization equilibrium in which all managers are indifferent
between North and South. Abstracting from cross-country efficiency differences in the model above leads to
the same prediction. To see this point consider an alternative version of the model in which North and South
have the same efficiency, but Northern agents draw their skill endowment from a better distribution. Let
ZN = ZS = 1 and assume that the skill distribution at birth in the North first order stochastically dominates
the distribution in the South, FN (θ) ≤ FS(θ)∀ θ with strict inequality for θ ∈ (θS , θ¯N).
With these assumptions the model is similar to Dasgupta (2012) except that: (i) all workers are sym-
metric, meaning there is no incentive for high knowledge managers to match with high skill workers, and;
(ii) the supply of training is endogenous to managers’ time allocation. Using analogous reasoning to that
employed in the proof of Proposition 2 it is straightforward to check that the greater supply of skills in the
North implies the autarky no training wage is higher in the North than in the South. However, as in Dasgupta
(2012) globalization leads to a factor price equalization equilibrium in which the no training wage and the
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training price are equal across countries. In the integrated equilibrium all managers are indifferent between
locating in North and South.25 Labor market clearing requires a net inflow of Northern managers to the
South, but there is no sorting of managers with different knowledge levels across countries.
These comparisons highlight how cross-country efficiency differences generate the sorting which drives
the key results in this paper.26 Micro-level data on managers’ characteristics and location decisions could be
used to distinguish between this paper and the predictions of Monge-Naranjo (2011) and Dasgupta (2012)
by testing for the existence of matching between high knowledge mangers and high efficiency countries.27
3.2 Welfare
Returning to the baseline model with ZN > ZS and assuming South is a small economy I will now consider
how global integration affects the Southern welfare function, V S(θ). Southern workers benefit from glob-
alization. From (10) their expected lifetime utility is proportional to the no training wage, which increases
following integration with the North. In addition, since wS is increasing in both ZS and ZN , steady state
workers’ welfare is increasing in both Southern productivity ZS and Northern productivity ZN . From (8)
a manager’s welfare is proportional to her profits. Using (18) a Southern manager who does not provide
training makes profits:
piS(θ) = θZS(θS1 )
α−1.
Such managers lose from globalization because an increase in the no training wage raises θS1 and lowers
profits. In the open economy equilibrium the welfare of managers who do not train is increasing in Southern
productivity. However, it is decreasing in Northern productivity because θS1 = θ
N
1 which is increasing
in ZN by Proposition 2. Since θS1 > θ
S,A
1 some agents switch from management to wage labor following
globalization. The continuity of V S(θ) implies that within this group of switchers relatively low skill agents’
welfare increases, while relatively high skill agents experience a welfare decrease.
The effect of global integration on the welfare of Southern managers who do give training is ambiguous.
25The only exception occurs if θN is sufficiently large that all Northern agents select into management. In this case all managers
must locate in the South.
26Remember that the equilibrium sorting characterized in Proposition 4 relies on the assumption that variation in Z affects not
only labor productivity, but also the productivity with which the managerial input and training are produced. See Section 4.1 for a
discussion of the case where Z only affects labor productivity.
27Although I am not aware of existing research that addresses this issue directly, Gibson and McKenzie (2011) report that
emigration rates from developing countries are substantially higher for more educated individuals and that management is one of
the top six occupations among tertiary educated developing country migrants to the US.
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On the one hand they face a higher efficiency wage which reduces the profitability of time allocated to
production. On the other hand they can hire Northern workers which may increase the profitability of
training. Due to the complementarity between managerial skill and host country efficiency the highest skill
managers obtain the greatest relative benefit from globalization, but whether they gain in absolute terms is
ambiguous. The lowest skill managers who give training must have lower welfare in the open economy
because of the continuity of V S(θ) at θ∗. Figure 5 plots V S(θ) in both the closed and open economy.28
Overall, globalization leads to a polarization in welfare outcomes. Low skill workers and possibly also the
high skill managers who set up firms in the North benefit from globalization, but medium skill agents lose
out.
Aggregate welfare, W , can be measured by the expected lifetime utility of an agent prior to learning her
initial skill level. In steady state:
W j =
1
p
[
wjF (θj1) +
∫ θ¯
θj1
pij(θ)f(θ)dθ
]
j = S,N.
For a small economy where no training occurs, such as the South, this definition of welfare also equals
the average expected utility from the current period onwards of all agents alive today, where aggregation
gives equal weight to each agent. Figure 6 plots aggregate Southern welfare in the open economy relative
to autarky as a function of Z
S
ZN
. It shows that welfare in the South increases due to globalization and that
the gains from integration are greatest when efficiency in the South is low meaning that globalization leads
to a large increase in the Southern no training wage. As ZS → ZN differences between the two economies
shrink, incentives to form international production teams disappear and the benefits of globalization vanish.
4 Efficiency, learning and sorting
This section considers the robustness of the results presented above to two extensions of the baseline model.
First, I allow for variation in the strength of the complementarity between country efficiency and managerial
skill. Second, I modify the training technology to introduce heterogeneity in workers’ ability to learn from
mangers. In both cases I analyze whether changing the baseline model affects how managers sort across
countries.
28Figure 5 is drawn with ZS = 0.57. In both Figures 5 and 6, ZN = 1.1.
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4.1 Efficiency and managerial productivity
In the baseline model firm location is determined by a trade-off between the cost of labor and the price of
training. Since the training price is convex in managerial skill, higher skill managers produce more training
and their location decision is more sensitive to the relative price of training across countries. The relationship
between a country’s efficiency and its training price depends on two countervailing forces – a wage effect
and a profit effect. At low levels of managerial skill the former force prevails and training is more expensive
in the South, but when θ is sufficiently high training is more expensive in the North. Therefore, the most
skilled managers always set up firms in the more productive country. In this section I extend the model to
analyze how the sorting of managers to countries depends on the strength of the profit effect, which in turn
is driven by the elasticity of a manager’s productivity with respect to her country’s efficiency.
Suppose that we generalize the output and training technologies by assuming that a manager from coun-
try j who allocates a fraction 1−h of her time to production produces (1−h) (Zj)β θ units of the managerial
input and h(1 − h)τ (Zj)β units of training, where β ≥ 0.29 β is the elasticity of managerial productivity
with respect to efficiency in the manager’s country. With this technology it is straightforward to show that
profit maximization implies pijk(θ) = θ
(
Zj
)β
p˜ik(θ), where p˜ik(θ) is given by (18) and:
ck(θ) =
1− p
p
[(
Zk
)β
θp˜i(θ)− wk
]
. (20)
As before time spent training is given by (14′) and both a manager’s time allocation and her choice of
location are independent of her home country.
Let us start by assuming that β = 0. In this case productivity depends only on host country efficiency
and a manager’s profits are independent of which country she comes from. This eliminates the profit effect
that tends to make the price of training higher in the North. Therefore, the price of training is always higher
in the South where the no training wage is lower. In equilibrium the efficiency wage is weakly lower in
the North meaning that firms which do not give training always weakly prefer to locate in the North. In
addition, whenever some Southern agents select into wage labor, there exists a skill threshold such that all
managers whose skill exceeds the threshold offer training in the South. This reverses the sorting of managers
across countries obtained when β = 1. The intuition for this result is that when a firm’s productivity is
29Set β = 1 to retrieve the technology used earlier in the paper. For the general technology (A1) and (A2) become τ <
4ζ
1−ζ
1
(ZN)β
and τ > p
1−p
1
(ZS)β
, respectively.
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independent of its manager’s home country, training is most valuable in the South where the no training
wage is lowest and agents have the most to gain from learning new skills. High skill managers hire Southern
workers in order to obtain the highest possible price for their training. This result holds regardless of country
size provided β = 0, but if we assume that the South is a small economy we obtain the following result
characterizing managerial sorting for general β > 0. A formal statement and proof of the Proposition are
given in the Appendix.
Proposition 6. Suppose South is a small country. Then no training occurs in the South in the open economy
steady state whenever either: (i) the elasticity β of managerial productivity with respect to country efficiency
exceeds some threshold β∗ < 1, or; (ii) the efficiency gap between South and North is sufficiently large.
From (20) we see that the complementarity between managerial skill and country efficiency is stronger
when β is higher. Consequently, a high β strengthens the profit effect on the price of training and when β is
sufficiently high, or the efficiency gap between countries is sufficiently large, the profit effect dominates the
wage effect and all training takes place in the North. However, when β < β∗ the profit effect is weak and
provided efficiency in the South exceeds some threshold Z∗(β) then the wage effect can dominate. When
the wage effect dominates labor market clearing in the South requires that the South has a strictly higher
efficiency wage than the North, all managers with θ < θ¯ strictly prefer to locate in the North and the highest
skilled managers with θ = θ¯ are indifferent between the two countries because the advantages of cheaper
labor in the North are exactly offset by a higher training price in the South.
4.2 Learning capacity
The baseline model maintains the assumption that, within each economy, all workers are symmetric. Con-
sequently, employment contracts are independent of workers’ managerial knowledge. In this section I show
that the paper’s prediction that globalization precipitates a brain drain from South to North is robust to
a modification of the training technology that introduces heterogeneity in workers’ ability to acquire new
skills. For simplicity I restrict attention to the case where the efficiency wage does not vary across countries.
Suppose agents differ in their learning capacity φ and that a worker with learning capacity φ who receives
q units of training has probability qφ of acquiring her manager’s skill level. Since the expected volume of
training required to reach any given skill level is decreasing in φ, it is reasonable to expect a positive corre-
lation between φ and θ. However, for present purposes greater generality can be maintained by leaving both
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the relationship between the two dimensions of agent heterogeneity and the distribution of φ unspecified.
Except for the addition of heterogeneity in learning capacity the model is unchanged from Section 3
above. We still have pijk(θ) = Zjθp˜ik(θ) where p˜ik(θ) is given by (18). Thus, a manager’s profit maximizing
training and location choices are independent of her country of origin and depend only on the efficiency
wages and training prices in different countries. However, the training price now depends on both the
country where a firm locates and the learning capacity of the firm’s trainees.
Let c(θ;φ,Z) be the training price paid to a skill θ manager by a learning capacity φ worker in an
efficiency Z country. Using (7) the training price is:
c(θ;φ,Z) =
1− p
p
φZθp˜i(θ)− (1− p)φV W (φ,Z)− 1
q
[
pV W (φ,Z)− w(Z)] ,
where V W (φ,Z) is the expected lifetime welfare of a learning capacity φ worker in an efficiency Z country
and the dependence of the no training wage on Z is made explicit. When all workers in a country are
symmetric pV W (Z) = w(Z) because managers appropriate the entire training surplus. However, when
there is heterogeneity in learning capacity across workers, the training surplus may be shared between
managers and workers and worker welfare may depend on φ. There are two cases to consider, either: (i)
pV W (φ,Z) = w(Z), or; (ii) pV W (φ,Z) > w(Z). In the later case the training price is increasing in the
quantity of training q, implying that it is optimal for managers to provide each of their trainees with the
maximum possible volume of training by choosing q = 1φ . Consequently, all trainees successfully acquire
their managers’ skills. It follows that in both cases (i) and (ii) the training price can be rewritten as:
c(θ;φ,Z) =
1− p
p
φZθp˜i(θ)− φ [V W (φ,Z)− w(Z)] . (21)
Observe that the training price is supermodular in θ and χ ≡ φZ. Thus, there is complementarity be-
tween managerial skill and the product of a trainee’s learning capacity with host country efficiency. The
additional benefit of training a worker with higher χ is greater for more skilled managers. This comple-
mentarity is analogous to the training price complementarity between θ and Z in the baseline model and it
has two important implications for matching between managers and workers and the allocation of training
within and across countries. First, within countries there is positive assortative matching between high φ
workers and high θ managers. Only workers whose learning capacity exceeds some threshold value re-
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ceive training30 and trainees with a higher learning capacity are matched with better managers and learn
more. Second, if the efficiency wage is constant across countries then in the open economy there is positive
assortative matching between high χ workers and high θ mangers. For a given efficiency wage, only the
training price matters for profit maximization and the complementarity embedded in (21) ensures that more
knowledgeable managers match with higher χ trainees. These predictions do not rely on the assumption that
there are only two countries. Proposition 7 summarizes equilibrium matching with heterogeneity in learning
capacity. The proof is in the Appendix.
Proposition 7. Suppose learning capacity φ differs across agents. In steady state: (i) there exists a threshold
learning capacity in each country below which workers do not receive training and above which all work-
ers become trainees, and: (ii) holding the efficiency wage constant, there is positive assortative matching
between high skill managers and trainees with high φ ∗ Z.
Proposition 7 shows that with heterogeneity in workers’ learning capacity the training a worker receives
is determined by the interaction of worker type and country efficiency. Assuming that the distribution of
learning capacity does not vary between North and South, the most knowledgable managers still choose to
locate in the North precipitating a brain drain of the best Southern managers. However, provided there is
sufficient variation in learning capacity,31 then, unlike in the baseline model, there is an overlap between the
skill distributions of managers who give training in the North and managers who locate in the South. High
learning capacity Southern trainees are employed by more skilled managers than low learning capacity
Northern trainees and, in contrast to Proposition 5, training occurs in the South even when it is a small
economy. Variation in learning capacity creates an incentive for managers to set up firms in the South in
order to match with high learning ability Southern workers, but it does not overturn the prediction that there
exists a skill threshold above which all managers choose to locate in the high efficiency North. Consequently,
Southern workers never learn the most advanced skills and in steady state there is a greater fraction of agents
in the extreme right tail of the skill distribution in the North than in the South.32
Proposition 7 also has several interesting corollaries. First, holding learning capacity constant trainees
30In general, the threshold may be sufficiently low that all workers in a country receive training or sufficiently high that no
workers are trained.
31In particular, we require that the heterogeneity in learning capacity is sufficiently large relative to Z
N
ZS
that the best Southern
workers have a higher χ than the worst Northern trainees.
32To solve the full general equilibrium model with heterogeneity in learning capacity it is first necessary to specify the distribution
of φ and the correlation between φ and θ. However, the discussion above demonstrates that the complementarity between θ and χ,
which drives matching between managers and trainees, does not depend on these details.
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in the North are trained by higher skill managers and attain a higher skill level than trainees in the South.
Second, holding managerial skill constant, mangers that locate in the South employ workers with greater
learning ability than managers in the North. Third, in equilibrium firms may choose to employ two types
of workers. Low learning capacity workers who do not receive training and high learning capacity workers
who become trainees. This outcome occurs when the production labor supplied by trainees is insufficient to
satisfy the firm’s labor demand and leads to within firm heterogeneity in worker type, job type and wages.
5 Conclusion
This paper presents a theory in which by accident of birth Northern agents have higher productive efficiency
– be it caused by superior institutions, infrastructure or education. Country efficiency and individual knowl-
edge are complements and if either the complementarity is sufficiently strong, or the efficiency gap between
North and South is sufficiently large, the North has a comparative advantage in high knowledge production
and there is a brain drain of high knowledge agents from South to North. However, if the complementarity
is weak and the efficiency gap is small the pattern of comparative advantage is reversed and high knowl-
edge agents are attracted to the South where workers with a low outside option will pay a higher price for
learning.
Low levels of skill and technology transfer from developed to developing countries are often explained
in terms of barriers to technology transfer or of developing countries’ lack of absorptive capacity – their
missing ability to learn. This paper suggests an alternative perspective. Even if agents in all countries have
the same capacity to learn and the learning technology does not discriminate between within-country and
cross-country transfers, when training requires a rival input – the time of high knowledge agents – that is
in limited supply, equilibrium knowledge transfer will depend on the income maximizing allocation of this
factor.
The paper offers a benchmark model in which all markets are perfectly competitive. It would be in-
structive to extend the model to include labor market imperfections that require managers and workers to
share the rents arising from knowledge transfer. Rent sharing would reduce the price of training from the
manager’s perspective leading managers to allocate less time to training and making their choice of location
more sensitive to relative labor costs. Importantly, rent sharing would also mean that learning brings welfare
gains in addition to higher knowledge. In this case, I hypothesize that a brain drain from South to North
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could result in a decrease in Southern welfare as Southern workers receive a lower share of the learning
rents because of reduced training in the South.
Finally, note that in applications where the amount of time a manager allocates to training is not of central
interest a considerable simplification to the model can be obtained by assuming that managers spend all
their time on production and skill transfer occurs through learning-by-doing. This assumption enhances the
model’s tractability because time allocation is no longer endogenous, while maintaining the cross-country
trade-off between labor costs and the value of learning.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
I will prove the result by contradiction. Let θ1 and θ2 be skill levels at which agents select into wage labor
and suppose there exists an employment contract (θ′1, w˜1, q1) that belongs to ψ(θ1), but not to ψ(θ2). Let
(θ′2, w˜2, q2) be an employment contract that belongs to ψ(θ2). Since (θ′j , w˜j , qj) ∈ ψ(θj) it follows from (7)
that:
V W (θj) =
w˜j + (1− p)qjV (θ′j)
1− (1− p)(1− qj) , j = 1, 2.
Note that the right hand side of this expression is independent of θj implying that the expected lifetime utility
of a worker employed on a given contract is independent of her initial managerial knowledge. In addition,
since all workers supply the same quantity Z of efficiency units of labor, the value to a firm of employing a
worker under a given contract does not depend on the worker’s managerial knowledge. Consequently, any
employment contract triple (θ′, w˜, q) offered by a firm, must be offered to workers of all skill levels. Thus,
Ψ(θ1) = Ψ(θ2).
There are now two possibilities to consider. First, V W (θ1) = V W (θ2). In this case workers with
skill θ1 are indifferent between the contract (θ′1, w˜1, q1) and the contract (θ′2, w˜2, q2), which contradicts
(θ′2, w˜2, q2) not belonging to ψ(θ1). Second, V W (θ1) 6= V W (θ2) and suppose without loss of generality that
V W (θ1) < V
W (θ2). In this case workers with skill θ1 would obtain strictly higher expected lifetime utility
under the contract (θ′2, w˜2, q2) and this contradicts (θ′1, w˜1, q1) ∈ Ψ(θ1). It follows that ψ(θ1) = ψ(θ2).
Proof of Proposition 2
To prove the result it is sufficient to show that the equilibrium value of θ1 is uniquely determined and is
strictly decreasing in ∆ ≡ p1−p 1τ 1Z if θ2 < θ¯. Noting that θ2 = θ11−∆ and substituting the steady state skill
distribution (16) into (17) we can rewrite the labor market clearing condition with θ1 as the only endogenous
variable:
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F (θ1)− 1− ζ
ζ
∫ θ¯
θ1
1−∆
ζH∗(θ)
ζ − (1− ζ)H∗(θ)f(θ)dθ =
1− α
α
1
θ1
[∫ θ1
1−∆
θ1
θf(θ)dθ +
∫ θ¯
θ1
1−∆
ζ [1− h∗(θ)]
ζ − (1− ζ)H∗(θ)θf(θ)dθ
]
. (22)
Now, from (14), we have that ∀ θ ≥ θ2:
h∗(θ) =
1
2
(1−D),
H∗(θ) =
1
4∆
p
1− p(1−D
2), (23)
ζ [1− h∗(θ)]
ζ − (1− ζ)H∗(θ) =
2∆(1 +D)
4∆− pδζ (1−D2)
≡ E,
where:
D ≡ θ
α−1
1
τ
θ
c(θ)
,
=
θ(4∆− 1)
θ − 2θ1 + 2
[
θ21 − θθ1 + θ2∆
] 1
2
. (24)
Noting that (A1) implies 4∆ > 1, differentiation of D can be used to show that ∂D∂θ1 > 0 and
∂D
∂∆ > 0 which
imply ∂H
∗(θ)
∂θ1
< 0 and ∂H
∗(θ)
∂∆ < 0 ∀ θ > θ2.
In addition, by differentiating E with respect to D we obtain:
∂E
∂D
=
2∆[
4∆− pδζ (1−D2)
]2 [4∆− pδζ (1 +D)2
]
.
Substituting for D and using θ > θ2 we have (1 + D)2 > 4∆ and since pδζ ≥ 1 it follows that ∂E∂D < 0.
Combining this with ∂D∂θ1 > 0 it immediately follows that
∂E
∂θ1
< 0. A similar argument shows that ∂E∂∆ < 0.
With these results in hand we can proceed to prove the proposition. The left hand side of (22) gives
labor supply as a function of θ1. It is continuous, non-positive when θ1 = θ, equal to 1 when θ1 = θ¯ and,
since ∂H
∗(θ)
∂θ1
< 0∀ θ > θ2, it is strictly increasing in θ1. The right hand side of (22) gives labor demand. It
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is continuous, positive when θ1 = θ and zero when θ1 = θ¯. Moreover, differentiating the right hand side of
(22) with respect to θ1 and using h∗(θ2) = H∗(θ2) = 0 and ∂E∂θ1 < 0 shows that is is strictly decreasing in
θ1. It immediately follows that (22) defines a unique solution for θ1 on
(
θ, θ¯
)
.
To prove the second part of the proposition, first note that when θ2 ≥ θ¯ (22) is independent of ∆,
meaning that θ1 does not depend on Z. When θ2 < θ¯ analogous arguments to those used above show that
the left hand side of (22) is strictly increasing in ∆, while the right hand side is strictly decreasing in ∆.
Consequently, we must have that θ1 is strictly decreasing in ∆.
Proof of Proposition 4
Let us start by considering agents’ selection into occupations. The skill threshold, θj1, at which country j
agents are indifferent between management and wage labor must satisfy pij(θj1) = w
j ⇔ θj1p˜i(θj1) = w
j
Zj
.
Since w
S
ZS
≤ wN
ZN
and θp˜i(θ) is strictly increasing in θ it immediately follows that θS1 ≤ θN1 with equality
if and only if w
S
ZS
= w
N
ZN
. Moreover, using the expression for the price of training in (19) we have that
cj(θj1) = 0, j = S,N and from the solution for the amount of time allocated to training in (14
′) we know
that c
j(θj2)
θj2
= 1τ
(
wk
Zk
)α−1
α
> 0. Since higher skill training is more valuable cj(θ) is strictly increasing in θ
and, therefore, θj1 < θ
j
2, j = S,N .
Now consider a manager’s choice of location when w
S
ZS
< w
N
ZN
. Since θj1 < θ
j
2, j = S,N there is always
a positive mass of managers who do not give training and, because the South has a lower efficiency wage,
these managers will always locate in the South. Labor market clearing in the South then requires θS1 > θ and
using the result proved above that θS1 ≤ θN1 we have that θN1 > θ. Given that a positive mass of Northern
agents choose to become workers labor market clearing in the North necessitates that a positive mass of
managers choose to locate in the North.
Define θ∗ ≡ inf {θ : p˜iN (θ) > p˜iS(θ)}. From the continuity of p˜iN (θ) and p˜iS(θ) it must be that
p˜iN (θ∗) = p˜iS(θ∗). Obviously, θN2 < θ∗ < θ¯. By applying the envelope theorem to the definition of
p˜ik(θ) in (18) we obtain:
dp˜ik(θ)
d
(
ck(θ)
θ
) = τhk∗(θ) [1− hk∗(θ)] .
Now note that: (i) h < 12 ⇒ ∂∂h [h(1− h)] > 0; (ii) p˜iN (θ) ≥ p˜iS(θ) ⇒ cN (θ) > cS(θ) since if the South
has both a lower efficiency wage and a higher training price then firms must make strictly higher profits in
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the South, and; (iii) from (14′), cN (θ) > cS(θ) and w
S
ZS
< w
N
ZN
together imply hN∗(θ) > hS∗(θ). Combining
these three observations we have that dp˜i
N (θ)
d
(
cN (θ)
θ
) > dp˜iS(θ)
d
(
cS(θ)
θ
) whenever p˜iN (θ) ≥ p˜iS(θ).
Next, from (18) and (19) we have that if p˜i(θ) = p˜ik(θ) then:
p˜i(θ) =
p
[
1− hk∗(θ)] (wk
Zk
)α−1
α − (1− p)τhk∗(θ) [1− hk∗(θ)] wkθ
p− (1− p)τhk∗(θ) [1− hk∗(θ)]Zk .
It follows that p˜i(θ) is non-decreasing in θ and using (19) this implies that both c
S(θ)
θ and
cN (θ)
θ are strictly
increasing in θ. Finally:
cN (θ)
θ
θ
cS(θ)
=
ZNθp˜i(θ)− wN
ZSθp˜i(θ)− wS ,
which is strictly increasing in θ given w
S
ZS
< w
N
ZN
. Putting everything together we have that an increase in
θ raises c
N (θ)
θ by more than
cS(θ)
θ , which in turn increases p˜i
N (θ) by more than p˜iS(θ) whenever p˜iN (θ) ≥
p˜iS(θ). Therefore, p˜iN (θ) and p˜iS(θ) satisfy a single crossing property and all mangers with skill θ > θ∗ set
up firms in the North.
If w
S
ZS
= w
N
ZN
then θS1 = θ
N
1 and
cN (θ)
cS(θ)
= Z
N
ZS
. Managers who do not give training are indifferent between
locating in the North and the South, while managers that do give training always prefer the North because it
has a higher training price. In this case θ∗ = θN2 < θS2 .
Proposition 6
If South is a small economy there exists β∗ < 1 such that if β ≥ β∗ no training takes place in the South in
the open economy steady state. If β < β∗ there exists Z∗(β) < ZN such that if ZS ≤ Z∗(β) no training
takes place in the South in the open economy steady state. If ZS > Z∗(β), θN,A2 < θ¯ and some Southern
agents select into wage labor then only managers with θ = θ¯ locate in the South and these managers provide
training.
Proof of Proposition 6
First we will characterize the closed economy steady state for general β. Let ∆ ≡ p1−p 1τ 1Zβ . Then following
the same steps used in Section 2 it is straightforward to show that θ1 =
(
w
Z
) 1
α Z1−β and θ2 = θ11−∆ . With
these expressions for θ1 and ∆ the labor market clearing condition (22) is unaltered, D is still given by (24)
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and h∗(θ), H∗(θ) and E are the same functions of D given in (23). Therefore, Proposition 2 implies that θ1
is uniquely determined and is strictly decreasing in ∆. It follows that θ1 is strictly increasing in Z whenever
β > 0.
Now consider the open economy. Since South is a small country wN , θN1 and θ
N
2 take the same values
as in autarchy. All that remains is to solve for wS . We cannot have w
S
ZS
< w
N
ZN
because if the efficiency wage
is lower in the South all managers who do not give training strictly prefer to locate in the South and this
violates labor market clearing. Given w
S
ZS
≥ wN
ZN
(20) implies that if β ≥ 1 then cN (θ) > cS(θ) ∀ θ ≥ θN1
meaning that there will never be any training in the South since the North has both a higher training price
and a weakly lower labor cost.
Suppose 0 < β < 1. Using (20) we can show that if w
S
ZS
= w
N
ZN
then c
N (θ)
cS(θ)
is strictly increasing in θ.
Therefore, a sufficient condition for w
S
ZS
= w
N
ZN
to hold in steady state is that θN2 ≤ θS2 . This restriction
ensures that all training takes place in the North allowing the Southern labor market to clear. Assuming
θS2 < θ
N
2 we can solve for θ
S
2 and compare the result to θ
N
2 obtaining:
θN2
θS2
=
ZN
ZS
(1− p)τ (ZS)β − p
(1− p)τ (ZN )β − p
,
≡ B.
Observe: (i) as (1−p)τ (ZS)β−p→ 0, B → 0 and asZS → ZN , B → 1; (ii)B is strictly increasing inZS
if ZS <
(
p
1−p
1
τ
1
1−β
) 1
β ≡ A(β) and is strictly decreasing in ZS if ZS > A(β), and; (iii)A(β) is unbounded
above as β → 1. Now define β∗ to be the smallest value of β ∈ (0, 1) such that ZN ≤ A(β∗) ∀β′ ≥ β∗
and let Z∗(β) be the smallest positive value of ZS such that B = 1. The observations above ensure that
β∗ exists and that Z∗(β) < A(β) whenever β < β∗. If either β ≥ β∗, or β < β∗ and ZS ≤ Z∗(β), then
B ≤ 1 implying that θN2 ≤ θS2 and there is no training in the South in steady state.
If β < β∗ and ZS > Z∗(β) then B > 1 and θS2 < θN2 . Consequently, managers with skill θ ∈ (θS2 , θN2 )
strictly prefer to locate in the South. Now if θS2 < θ¯, which is guaranteed whenever θ
N
2 = θ
N,A
2 < θ¯ this
contradicts labor market clearing in the South. Therefore, we must have w
S
ZS
> w
N
ZN
. It is possible that all
Southern agents choose to become managers,33 but if there is a non-zero labor supply in the South the only
way to obtain labor market clearing in the South is if managers with θ = θ¯ are indifferent between the two
33This possibility can be ruled out by setting θ = 0.
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